It's college football fans' favorite pastime: armchair quarterbacking, second-guessing, and complaining about play calling in hindsight.
It's something that will never go away. If a play works, the players are praised. If the play fails, the offensive coordinator is an idiot. It's part of the territory of being a coach, and CSU offensive coordinator Dan Hammerschmidt knows it. While he says he tries to ignore the criticism, he admits he hears it and it can get to him at times.
"You're never good enough. That's part of the deal," said Hammerschmidt, now in his 10th season at CSU--and fifth as a coordinator. "You've got to keep striving to be better. But,
I'm as hard on myself--and I'm sure all play callers are that way--about if it doesn't work, what could you have done to make it work. Like every position in this business, if you're not doing
well, you're getting criticized, and if you're doing well, you're not. So, I think you've just got to work to get better and make it work."
Hammerschmidt certainly works to get better. His job entails much more than simply randomly picking plays off a chart and hoping they work. It's a grueling day-in-day-out grind of preparation that demands an extraordinary amount of time and attention to detail. Take this week for example.
CSU is coming off a hard-fought 21-17 victory over Utah Saturday night at Hughes Stadium, and did so in stunning fashion with the defense stonewalling the Utes at the goal line four straight plays in the game's waning seconds. Rather than celebrate the victory, coaches had to immediately get to work.
Breaking down game tape
The basis for developing 100%;">the game plan each week comes from extensive breakdown of game tape--both CSU's and its opponent's. Most times, coaches will gather after a Saturday game and watch tape from the game for a few hours to grade it, break it down, and prepare it for showing to the players. They'll then get up early Sunday morning and continue with their studies of the previous game until mid-afternoon. At that point the coaching staff will turn their attention to the upcoming opponent for the week. This can get tedious, as the football department typically acquires at least three of the opponent's game tapes and as many as 11. For example, in preparation for the University of Colorado this year, CSU coaches studied all 11 of CU's games from 2004. For Minnesota, the staff had several games, including their Music City Bowl appearance from last year. Coaches watch as much as humanly possible to analyze trends, strengths, and weaknesses of the Rams' opponents.
They then break the game tape analysis into 20 different categories. Graduate Assistants do much of the preparations two weeks before the Rams face an opponent. So, for instance, while
the team is preparing for BYU this week, GAs are already breaking down tape of Wyoming for the October 22 game.
GA Bill McMahon, who graduated from the University of Montana and has served as a defensive assistant for CSU since 2003, is in charge of breaking down offensive game tape. Brian Woll, who graduated from the University of Rhode Island and has served as an offensive line assistant since last season, handles the defensive tape. They also get supplemental help from student assistants Shaun Hunter and Neil Hitchen.
Occasionally, teams will refuse to share game tape with CSU, as Southern Cal coach Pete Carroll did last season. But most do share. When the football office actually receives tape can vary,
however. CSU got Air Force game tape nine days prior to the September 29 matchup with CSU, which gave the GAs a decent amount of time to get to work. Sometimes it arrives later. But as soon as it comes, the GAs import the tape into the computer and get it broken down.
When the time comes for the offensive coaches to begin studying, they'll first analyze opponents' formations. So, for instance, when studying BYU tape this week, they'll look at all of the Cougars' three-receiver/one-tight-end formations, all of their four-wide sets, all of their two-tight-end sets, and every other formation they run. Whatever formation the opponent runs, the
coaches study it, and do so for every game tape they have of the opponent. Then, coaches study down and distance and field position situations. For example, this week, they'll study what the Cougars typically do on first down when they line up in certain
formations. They pay special attention to what the opponent typically does on third and fourth downs, goal line situations, and other special circumstances.
After completing study of the opponent's formations, the offensive coaches break up into individual rooms by around 6 to 7 p.m. Sunday. Hammerschmidt typically gathers with wide receivers coach Marc Lubick and running backs coach Mick Delaney and they begin by breaking down the defense's coverages and starting to build tape for the players to study. Offensive line coach Darrell Funk typically works by himself and breaks down the fronts that his offensive linemen will face. When completed with this segment, the coaches will have compiled a DVD, which will be given to the players on Monday. The DVD covers every front and coverage scheme they're going to face each week, and the players are responsible for studying it.
But, the coaches' day is not done yet. After several hours of studying coverages and defensive fronts, the offensive coaches join together again for another few hours to watch the blitz tape.
A few weeks ago, when CSU hosted Nevada, the coaches had to break down tape on the Wolf Pack defense, which blitzes 95 percent of the snaps. The coaches watch every blitz that the opponent runs against every formation. By the time the coaches leave Sunday
night somewhere between 11 p.m. and midnight--about 16 hours after their day began--they can chalk up their duties as being halfway done.
Monday morning, the coaches get up and have until about midday before they have to gather with the players to watch the game tape of the last game. So, up until that point, coaches are studying opponents' down-and-distance trends, what they do defensively near the goal line, in the redzone, and from the 3- to 12-yard lines and 12- to 25-yard lines, for example. Coaches will study other situations, such as being pinned deep in their own territory and how defenses play against that.
By Monday night, the coaches study what they call the "self-scout" from past games. The self-scout is an analysis of CSU's own offense and what formations the offense has
typically been running with each personnel group, and what plays have been typically called with those formations or players on the field. The coaches break out these trends and write them on a white board, and GAs calculate all the percentages. For instance, they'll analyze scenarios such as, "When CSU motions the fullback to a strong set, what do we typically run?" The GAs will show that 50 percent of the time the offense has run a handoff off-tackle, 35 percent of the time the offense has run ran play-action passes, and 15 percent of the time the quarterback threw the ball downfield.
"The self-scout basically helps you figure out what your own tendencies are and enables you to try to break your tendencies," said Hammerschmidt, who this week had five self-scout tapes to watch. "About every third game, you try to break your tendencies. You've got to keep a good self-scout going because that's basically what the other defenses are doing. You think like your opponent, who is thinking 'When Kory Sperry is in the game and there are two backs, what are we doing and what do we have to stop it?' We try to stay ahead of that."
At the end of the night Monday, the coaches have to have the game tape studies finalized and have a game plan ready for the players. They'll also set a practice plan for Tuesday through
Friday. Based on the opponent tape that they've watched, offensive coaches can use that information to determine what runs they'll use out of specific formations during practice that week. They figure out which formations and plays need to receive the most repetitions during the week to prepare the players for the opponent's defensive looks. The offense takes about 50-60 snaps in practice each week, and according to Hammerschmidt, the players need to see various plays four to five times each in order to absorb what they are learning. That's why the prior preparation is so important to developing a practice plan.
Same goes for the passing game. Coaches try to show the players every passing route that will be run into every coverage several times per week. It's coached not only on the field, but also in
game tape viewing with the players and in meetings.
All the while, Hammerschmidt is continually working on the week's game plan and ultimately completes it by Thursday. Once finished it is printed and distributed to each coach for review,
commentary, and suggestion.
Hammerschmidt has a four-page play sheet that he uses for each game. He and former co-offensive coordinator John Benton came up with the template (see images) several years ago, and Hammerschmidt makes modifications to it each year. He said he has borrowed some ideas from the Denver Broncos, and continually tweaks it to optimize the format to make play calling on the fly a little easier.
The play sheet, which you can see Hammerschmidt toting on the sidelines during each game and referring to in between each play, lists every play that the offense has run during the week that's going to go against the opponent's front. The first two pages of the play sheet chart are broken down by personnel group.
The first page of the play sheet includes boxes for "regular", "police", and "lightning" personnel groups. The regular personnel group includes Kory Sperry and Matt Bartz on the field simultaneously and two wide receivers. The chart lists every play that Hammerschmidt believes will work in that formation, with runs on the left-hand side of the chart and play-action passes, screens, and drop-back passes on the right. So, as long as the regular personnel group is on the field, Hammerschmidt can call plays right out of those boxes. For each personnel group, there are four or five formations with plays for each.
The "police" personnel group involves inserting a B-back in the game, with Jimmy Green or Tristan Walker lining up at fullback and tight end Matt Bartz also on the field. In this
personnel group, the plays aren't quite as flexible, because the formations are more limited due to the style of personnel on the field. The fullback can't split out like Sperry, for example, so
there are typically fewer pass plays and more running plays in the "police" box.
The "lightning" personnel group involves four wideouts (Sperry is sometimes used in that group) and this box is mostly populated with pass plays down the field.
On the second page of the play sheet are CSU's three-tight-end personnel groups. So, if that group is on the field, Hammerschmidt simply calls the plays listed in that box, and varies his calls according to the flow of the game.
The third page of the play sheet focuses on third-down situations. They are listed in the order Hammerschmidt wants to call them. If he sees an opportune chance to throw a wide receiver
screen, fire a deep ball downfield, or run a draw play, he simply finds the according play on the sheet. Of course, he can change on fly if he notices, for instance, if the defense is playing more
man-to-man, which the coaches possibly didn't expect. The coaches might shift gears and call more drags and other plays that work well against the man-coverage.
Play sheet Page 3, broken out by third-down yardages
and other yardage situations. (Click to enlarge)
designed to go deep downfield. Sometimes on third-and-short situations Sonny Lubick comes on the headsets and asks, "Think we can make it on fourth down? Let's take a shot (going deep on third down)". So those potential plays are listed under the "shot" heading.
Then there are separate boxes for redzone plays (eight to 12 calls), plays when the offense is backed up within the five-yard line (eight calls), two-point plays (about four calls), shots (six
calls), goal line plays (eight calls), and second-and-15 (eight calls).
These categories make it easy for Hammerschmidt to choose a play in seconds during the heat of a game. He doesn't have to think as much about what should and shouldn't work because it has
all been tirelessly analyzed and broken down in game tape studies earlier in the week.
When the game is moving along well, and things are going according to plan, the offensive coordinator can get in a groove. However, should there be a penalty that suddenly changes a
situation from a second-and-short to a second-and-15, it would be extremely difficult to manage without having the plays for that category already broken out and easy to find on the play sheet.
There are so many ways to play a second-and-15, and the first train of thought is to fire the ball down the field to pick up the first down all at once. But, Hammerschmidt calls a lot of plays
that are designed to pick up six to seven yards and create a manageable third down. It's a scenario the offense practices at length and the game plan was thought out days in advance, so
split-second decisions are minimized.
The fourth and final page of the play sheet is the two-minute and four-minute offense. The four-minute offense is based on a situation where the offense wants to get into a personnel set that is able to run the clock down when the Rams have the lead. It's a personnel set that coaches believe the offense can run the ball the best out of.
In the two-minute offense side of the play sheet, there are boxes for specific hurry-up scenarios such as:
- "Dead Final Four" where Hammerschmidt can select from four calls for when the ball is dead, and there are only about 40 seconds left or time for about four plays left in the game.
- "Dead Ball with TOs", meaning the offense has a little bit more time to work with because it still has timeouts remaining.
- "Live Ball with Final Four plays", meaning the clock is running, and the offense has 40 seconds or less, and the plays have to be called "live".
- "Live Ball with Time and TOs", which involves having two minutes left with two to three timeouts.
Play sheet Page 4, broken out by special situations such as "Last seconds, need 10 yards for a field goal attempt". (Click to enlarge)
In each scenario, Hammerschmidt has listed a set of specific plays the coaches feel will work in those situations and can make the call in just seconds.
On right side of the final page of the play sheet, there are categories for the final offensive play of the game, including "Last For Field Goal, Need 10-Plus Yards", "Last For Touchdown, Need 25-Plus Yards", "Last For Touchdown, Inside 50", "Last For Touchdown, Outside 50", and "Last Must Throw at Goal Line".
So, for example, the "Last For Touchdown, Need 25-Plus Yards" play is a non-Hail Mary situation, an was the category used when Hammerschmidt called a "Four Vertical" play for a touchdown pass from Justin Holland to Sperry just before halftime of the CU game. On the "Last For Touchdown, Inside 50" play, Hammerschmidt has a hook-and-ladder, a tip play,
and a Hail Mary. On the "Last For Touchdown, Outside 50", the situation typically means the offense has to go 70-80 yards with only a few seconds remaining. So for example, when the Rams needed a touchdown from their own 20-yard line in he final seconds vs. CU, Hammerschmidt called a play from this box. His selection was a tip play, which nearly worked had Johnny Walker got in the way of the middle safety. Luke Roberts made the tip and David Anderson made the catch, but the safety made what was a touchdown-saving tackle.
Of course, as the game goes on, Hammerschmidt makes observations of what is and isn't working, and can jot down ideas of plays to run later in the game.
Using pre-planned play scriptsLike most NFL teams, CSU will begin the first few series of the game with a pre-planned play script, meaning no matter what is going on in the game, Hammerschmidt sticks to a script of plays. The purpose of "scripting" is it gives offensive coaches a chance to analyze how defenses are going to react to certain offensive personnel groups and formations. For instance vs. CU in
the opener, CSU coaches wanted to see how the Buffaloes were going defend the Rams' no-back sets. So on the second play of that game, Hammerschmidt purposefully put the offense into a no-back set to see if the Buffs took the same approach as the previous year when they checked to a basic defense and got out of some of blitzes. If the Buffs were to do that this year, CSU would shift and go back to a normal formation and try to run a play to catch CU off guard.
Then, later in the script, the offense went back into twins formations (with two receivers on one side), unbalanced formations, and two-back sets to learn CU's reaction.
"You want to see what their basic adjustments are going on with the game," Hammerschmidt said. "You're not necessarily throwing your best plays at them, but you're looking for their formation adjustments and anything that they may have in their game plan that you may be able to take advantage of.
"Sometimes scripts mess you up and we don't do it all the time. We didn't do one for Nevada. Some teams you just know how they're going to line up every game. Nevada lines up and blitzes
every snap from one side or another…they don't really care what you do. But sometimes scripts will mess you up because you don't get a rhythm and don't get used to the game. You're trying to see things and all of a sudden you're 10 plays in and your script isn't going well, just like the Minnesota game. So, then you say, 'let's get to our good stuff' so we go off the script, around Play
6 or Play 8, and chuck a deep ball to Sperry or something, and
that's what we did against Minnesota. When a script isn't going well, you say, 'let's get something going here.'"
Relaying the plays into the game
Now that you know what goes into preparing a game plan, and how the offensive coordinator goes about selecting each play, the next step is how to get the plays relayed into the game to be executed by the players.
First, Hammerschmidt must call a "personnel group" (i.e., "regular", "police", or "lightning") each time he calls a play. Sometimes he'll call for the regular personnel group with Sperry and Bartz and keep that group on the field for a couple first downs. Special teams coach Dave Arnold is responsible for signaling the personnel group calls, so every play the players have to be watching him. Sometimes the offense will change personnel every snap, which works to keep defenses off balance. But, sometimes it's more ideal to keep the same personnel group on the field for an entire drive to keep continuity, tempo, and get something going. So, Hammerschmidt will tell Arnold over the headsets that he'd like to keep the "regular" personnel in the game for six to eight plays to see if they can get something going.
But each time Hammerschmidt calls a play, he first calls the personnel group. An example call is: "Police, King Right, 28 Force". By saying "Police" at the beginning of the call, it tells Arnold to hold up the hand signal to notify the players of the personnel group. The rest of the call announces what play is to be run. There are several ways to relay the call into the players on the quarterbacks--typically Caleb Hanie and Billy Farris--who listen to the calls through headsets and then accordingly relay it into the huddle through hand signals from the sidelines. When using this method, typically one of the quarterbacks gives the "live" signals, and one gives the "dead"
signals. The quarterback on the field knows which of the two backups to watch for the real signals. (Hammerschmidt or Marc Lubick can also relay the play in through hand signals.) Most
teams have a GA with binoculars on the sidelines trying to steal signals or read lips. That's why you see many coaches covering their mouths as they call the play. The coaches also change the
signals every couple of series to ensure defenses can't catch on. The backup quarterbacks practice signaling every day in practice and are able to signal almost every play in the playbook.
The second method is running in the plays via the wide receivers. When using this method, the backup quarterbacks can continue to give "phony" signals to keep watchful defenses and opposing coaches guessing.
The QB's wristband with about 50 plays he can refer to in order to call plays. (Click to enlarge)
The third method of relaying in the plays is via a quarterback's wristband (see image), which contains about 50 of the top plays that the coaches liked for that particular game and a lot of thekey passes for third down situations. Each play has a corresponding number and whatever number the coach calls, the quarterback refers to the wristband and calls that play, either in the huddle or at the line of scrimmage.
About 15-20 plays per game are run off the quarterback's wristband, about 30-40 plays are signaled in, and about 10-20 are relayed in via a wide receiver bringing the play from the sidelines into the huddle.
Delay of game penalties
With all of the shuffling of personnel, decision-making on selecting plays, and time required to signal in those plays, it's amazing there aren't more delay of game penalties. Hammerschmidt said most of the Rams' delay of game penalties are not related to personnel shuffling or relaying in a play.
"We haven't really had one yet (this year) going from the sideline," he said. "We did have about 2-3 last year going from the sideline last year for some reason. Sometimes you get into a game and a receiver is tired--he's just run eight plays--and he jogs on and off the field. We're on them all the time to sprint back and forth. That's one of the problems when you run plays off the sidelines (via receivers). I kind of like to signal plays better.
"The (penalties) we've had this year, we're in a lot more shotgun than we have been in the past and we've got some protection things that are a lot tougher for the quarterback this year than we've had in the past. The (penalty) in the Colorado game, was a no-back play down in the redzone. We went to no-backs with five wides and Justin was looking around at the coverage and
I guess just didn't feel good about his protection because they were bluffing a blitz. I guess it was probably because it was a new system and didn't have a good feel. He really didn't need to do anything, he just needed to get the ball snapped, and wasn't watching the play clock. So that play was a little bit on him just not feeling good about the protection.
"At Minnesota, we had a motion that didn't go fast enough on that crucial third-down play. We had a motion that he was trying to send and he didn't get across there fast enough, and again didn't watch the play clock. Even though the receiver was slow, he could have looked at the play clock and just looked up and called timeout. So, two of those plays early this year were on the quarterback not watching the play clock.
But Hammerschmidt said there have been plenty of instances in the past where failed player substitutions have caused delays.
"For instance, if we switch tight ends and try to get Sperry to a certain position to get him the ball--the same thing we used to do with (Joel) Dreessen--you've got to do it with a personnel group, so Arnold needs to give the signal to switch the two tight ends. But, sometimes the kid is tired and he's not looking to the sidelines. We'll have to call a timeout or get a delay of game penalty."
Changing the play at the line of scrimmage
As much preparation that goes into calling the plays, Hammerschmidt still allows his quarterbacks to change the play at the line of scrimmage--in certain situations.
"We let them change some of them--not every play though," Hammerschmidt said. "We've never let them change every play. Probably 60-70 percent of the plays we call are meant to be run. The Broncos don't change any plays. We can't go that far yet; Justin has the ability to probably check 25 to 40 percent of the plays during the game, depending on game plan.
"Sometimes you're rolling and you know what fronts you're going to get and you can scheme it out pretty good and be pretty safe knowing what you're going to get from the defense. Some teams are pretty vanilla. San Diego State, for instance, you don't check anything against those guys. They line up the same way every snap, they've got a couple of blitzes, and they just come after you. They do their deal, and you pretty much know when you call the play what you're going to get. Other teams--for instance, Nevada--we checked some things away from blitzes, maybe a pass to a run or a run to a pass, depending on what you see. So, (quarterbacks) have the ability to do that, but the problem is if you give it to them all the time, all the defense does is disguise and half the time you can't tell what the heck they're in out there and you end up having the quarterback check out of some pretty good plays."
Withstanding the mental pressure
Being an offensive coordinator is not an easy job. Not only are you managing personnel groups and play calling in the heat of a game and being counted on by players, fellow coaches, and fans to come up with a winning play call in a matter of seconds, but you've also got dozens of voices yelling in your ear at all times of the game.
"You've got to try to stay calm," Hammerschmidt said. "The biggest pressure is the headsets. I mean everybody has got a headset on. We must have 100 headsets. Sonny can click over
obviously, and he does that quite a bit. We've got GAs on the headsets, we've got QBs on the headsets…we've got everybody in the box and all the assistants--everybody's got headsets. Some of those situations, everybody wants to throw some idea or comment out there, and remind you of something. 'This is what we did last time.' So, my job is knowing that this guy is supposed to be talking now. A lot of times Sonny comes on in those tough situations. Most of the time the plays you need to call, you just call one and you just go. But the pressure ones are the third downs, the fourth downs, the backed up third downs, the goal line things, all the third downs and key situations, two-point plays, and all of that, the head coach--Sonny--always comes on and says 'Hey, what about this, how about that, what do they play here?' Then two or three other guys start talking when Sonny's talking and it gets to be a mess, and you've just got to tell everybody to shut the heck up. That happens quite a bit."
Hammerschmidt said that the staff has implemented some rules, in large part due to the headset chaos that ensued during last year's goal line fiasco at CU. This year, there are only one or
two coaches who are supposed to talk over the headsets. A primary one is a GA up in the coaches box who reminds Hammerschmidt of what plays he has run in certain situations earlier in a game. But, still there are times--like in Saturday's game vs. Utah when coaches were yapping over the headsets about what to do during the Rams' final goal line stand--when coaches go over their boundaries.
Communication in moderation, however, is crucial Hammerschmidt said. "Communication obviously between the staff is huge. Sometimes somebody gets a feel up in the press box and says, 'Hey, Dan, we're really knocking these guys back', and you may not get that feeling from your vantage point on the sidelines. So, it's everybody communicating together. When (former co-coordinator John Benton) and I were together, I'd say, 'I think they're set up for a good pass here', and John would think, 'We've got to slam three more balls here.' So, it's just communication. Like anything, you're never perfect. You want to be perfect. You can always get
better, and Sonny is always trying to push us to look at ourselves and try to see where we can be better on those play calls, or our situations, or even the game scripts and all of that."
Hammerschmidt is never satisfied with how he calls a game. He's always asking himself what he could have done differently, and how he can get better the next week. Every Sunday, he accepts
constructive criticism, suggestions, and ideas from his boss, Sonny Lubick, and all of the other coaches as they watch game tape together. Everybody discusses what worked well, and what could have gone better.
"Obviously you want to make the perfect call every time, and not everybody does, but if something doesn't work, there's always a better call, and if something works, it's a heck of a call. I know that. But there's always times when you look back at the games and you say, 'Shoot, I wish I would have thrown a screen here maybe, or I wish I would have slammed the ball three more times here.'"
Hammerschmidt knows his critics are out there, and said while he shrugs it off, it can bother him at times.
"It's human nature," he said. "You want to do the right thing and want to do a better job. I always look at myself, what I can do better."
by
Joel Cantalamessa
Managing Editor
Oct 11, 2005
